Guessing is not a strategy: How to build decision velocity with AI and real-time data
June 10, 2026 | Live Webinar
George Jetson, Bring Me A Rock!
| The Jetsons was an animated situation comedy by Hanna-Barbera, aired originally in 1962, but set one-hundred years into the future, in 2062. Where The Flintstones was set in the Stone Age, The Jetsons was its futuristic counterpart, and depictions of how the titular family lived were both colorful and fanciful. The family’s patriarch, George, worked (will work?) for Spacely Sprockets, where his job appeared primarily to arrive at work (via flying car, of course), take a moving sidewalk to his control panel/desk, and press a single button. If the reason why George was uniquely qualified for this task was mentioned, I don’t remember it (and, just for the record, I was too young to watch it when it first aired – I saw it in reruns). Meanwhile, Back In The Project Management World… Efforts to more fully integrate Artificial Intelligence (AI) into the PM world have some level of fascination for me. Make no mistake – I am absolutely not an AI alarmist, but I can see a certain scenario unfolding that would make us PMs’ lives harder, and it has to do with this idea that critical information streams can be had rather simply, simply because technology is advancing. After all, if the readily-available AI bots out there can write up a believable Baseline Change Proposal or Variance Analysis Report, how much harder could it be to produce more complex, enterprise-wide PM documents and reports? Here is where The Jetsons and the traditional “bring me a rock” exercises come together. Quick reference: a “bring me a rock” exercise is when a superior in your organization wants you to produce a certain thing, but their scope definition is, shall we say, wanting. You take your best shot at delivering what you believe your superior has requested, only to learn that what you produced is certainly not meeting expectations. The dead giveaway that you are in a BMAR cycle is when the requestor can’t be any more specific about what it is that they desire. You leave the presentation upbraided and frustrated, without really knowing why, and needing to come up with some other You see, plenty of these “enterprise” systems promise highly valuable information streams at (almost literally) the touch of a George Jetson-esque button. The problem is that the specific information streams that are held to be highly valuable vary from manager to manager, organization to organization. For example, consider the numerous sources needed to generate an informed facility resource plan for the next, say, fiscal quarter: ·Available resources, both human and non (payroll, inventory, facility management system, etc.), ·Programmatic load (General ledger, scheduling system), ·Anticipated programmatic load (contract backlog, proposal backlog), ·Gap analysis of the existing programmatic load to the existing resource profile (the previous bullet’s data, plus HR [projected adds] and facility capacity), ·Gap analysis of the projected programmatic load and projected resource capacity, …among many others. There is simply no way any one computer program could synthesize this information stream reliably, even if it could successfully crawl all of the data sources it would need, which is itself unlikely. Keep in mind that this is just one product that would be expected out of an enterprise-wide system. If one were to add in other, more complex information-starved decisions (such as whether or not to respond to Request for Proposals on scope that is similar, but not identical to, the existing portfolio), and the highly improbable nature of such a comprehensive Information Technology program becomes clearer. And those issues manifest even before other, more fundamental ones would have to be definitively resolved. For example, ask a typical PM how to generate an Estimate at Completion, and she will likely respond “Easy! Divide the Cost Performance Index into the Budget at Completion.” Pose the same question to a member of the same organization’s Finance and Accounting department, and he will likely respond “Easy! Take the average monthly cost expenditures for that Project, normalize it by the number of working days in each month, and then project that figure out for the remainder of the period of performance.” Each is likely to be supremely confident that their way is the right one (though the F&A fellow shouldn’t be); but, unless this enterprise system has been told how to approach this particular data processing point, it’s going to generate an “answer” that is only useful to a fraction of the macro-organization. So, here’s my ultimate take-away: if your organization has been sold on some software company’s promises of an on-demand, reliable, all-encompassing information stream that renders their high-level decisions intuitively obvious, step back, take a breath, and ask: “Can you be a little more specific about what, exactly, that output looks like?" |
Posted on: May 28, 2026 12:44 AM
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How To Obstruct A PMO
| I believe one of the most difficult barriers to PMO success lands squarely in the organizational behavior and performance realm. You’re not failing to advance PM in your organization because its basic principles are invalid – in many cases, it’s because others in the macro-organization are dead-set against it, but can’t articulate their reasons out in the open, lest they be exposed as charlatans and Jungle Fighters[i]. So, if they need desperately to slow or even stop altogether your PM-maturing initiatives, but can’t say so (or why) out in the open, what are they to do? Well, obstruct, of course. How does this devious obstruction take place? How is the honest PMO Director to recognize it? Fortunately, the obstructionists themselves are often rather thick, and their tactics are readily uncovered. Unfortunately, even the thickest of them, wielding highly disingenuous tactics, will often find traction, particularly among others within the organization that, for various reasons, do not want an effective PMO in-place. What follows is a partial list of some of the more common obstructionists’ tactics. ·The Silent Veto. This occurs when the executives, managers, and actual workers will tell you to your face that they’re all on-board with your attempts at advancing PM maturity within the organization – but, in reality, they are absolutely set against it. So, when it comes time for them to do something other than offer verbal support in a meeting, you know, actually do something, even if they’ve stated clearly that they will – they just don’t show up. ·The Silent Veto’s near-cousin is the Slow Roll. Years ago, when I was a columnist for PMNetwork magazine, one of the other columnists was the brilliant Bud Baker, who would go on to become a Professor Emeritus at Wright State University’s Business School. He was helping me with my first book, Things Your PMO Is Doing Wrong (PMI Publishing, 2008) when he told me about this technique. Like the Silent Veto, people will tell you to your face that they think you’re doing the right thing, and will also promise to help. However, in this variant they actually do help – just not enough to get you to a point where your advancement doesn’t retreat at the first sign of resistance. It’s almost as if these members of the organization know exactly how much energy is needed to get you to the next level, and will deliberately provide a fraction of it. That way no one can accuse them of enacting the Silent Veto, even though the results are exactly the same. ·The less-devious opposition members will often claim that even basic PM techniques are prohibitively expensive, time-consuming, and difficult. Essentially, they’re saying the information streams being generated aren’t worth the problems involved in gathering the necessary data. Few things will scare off willing participants faster than the notion that they will be expected to work harder for limited – or even no – additional rewards. Now, GTIM Nation is aware that I maintain that every manager of a Project does basic Earned Value analysis, whether they’re aware of it nor not. Here’s my proof: on any job, if you are informed that you are half-spent, what’s the first thought that enters into your mind? Is it not, “am I half-done?” At that moment, an Earned Value analysis has been performed. Basic PM techniques aren’t difficult nor expensive, and any assertion to the contrary is indicative of another agenda in-play. ·If you do successfully navigate the juice-not-worth-the-squeeze gambit, its evil opposite may well make an appearance. This obstruction is based on the (equally idiotic) notion that, even if the sought-after cost and schedule performance information didn’t come at too-dear a price, it still isn’t worth it, because the accountants have the cost side of things covered, and their milestone lists or action item logs are sufficient for managing the schedule. But of all of the Hatfield’s Incontrovertible Rules of Management, I am most confident in the one that states that there is no cost performance possible without earned value, and only very poor schedule performance possible without critical path (interestingly, a crude but very usable schedule performance information stream can be derived from Earned Value alone, but that’s a subject for a future post). As with the earlier example of performing an EV analysis almost automatically, the percent complete data point is central to any and all Project-related performance measurement. Self-identifying PMs who eschew even basic cost and schedule performance management have either already experienced huge delays and overruns, or they will in the near-to-mid future. Obstructionism within the macro-organization has to be one of the most frustrating barriers to advancing PM capability (or any capability, for that matter), and there’s really no universally-applicable method for overcoming it. I’m beginning, though, to understand why Machiavelli advised the new prince to do away with all of the former prince’s courtiers – institutional obstructionism is not new, but it was dealt with far more severely hundreds of years ago. Maybe I’ll go back and re-read The Prince. [i] Maccoby, Michael, The Gamesman, Bantam Books, 1978. |
Posted on: May 18, 2026 11:36 PM
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Rage, Rage Against The Dying Of The Project
| Projects, by definition, have a discernible beginning and ending date (quick PM hack: each of the Work Breakdown Structure elements, by extension, should also have a discernible beginning and ending date, Rolling Wave/Planning Packages excepted. Otherwise, you probably have a Function or Organizational Breakdown element on your hands, which DOES NOT belong in the WBS). As your Project’s end date approaches, a whole new set of managerial challenges present themselves, and, if they are mis-managed, future successes may very well become more difficult to achieve. But first, a quick evaluation of Matrix Management. Erik Francis, in cloudbees.com[i], actually refers to Matrix Management as a “fad,” one of the top management fads of the century[ii], in fact. And he’s not alone – I’ve seen Matrix Management show up on other business writers’ list of “management fads.” I think this is rather unfortunate, and points to a certain insensitivity (if not ignorance) of some of the essential elements that project-dependent organizations must integrate into their business models if they are to succeed, or even survive. For those new to the concept, Matrix Management asserts that each employee who charges to a specific project (or projects) essentially reports to two managers: the PM, and the “line” manager. This latter is responsible for the employee’s career track, and includes, among other things (like training), that employee’s “coverage,” or where he or she will charge their time. I would argue that this is a natural, holistic division of managerial authority and responsibility in organizations with a sizeable project portfolio. It leaves PMs free to focus on, well, PM stuff, like completing the scope on-time, on-budget, without having to worry about things like where their mid-level engineers rank in relation to the organization’s other engineers when it comes time for performance evaluations. Your typical PM has no idea how other Projects’ personnel are performing, and would, therefore, have no valid basis of comparison. However, those engineers’ Line Manager would know, or could more readily find out. But where Matrix Management really comes into its effectiveness is when a given Project is nearing its completion. In organizations with a large or expanding contract backlog, transitioning personnel to new Project work is usually straight-forward, assuming that their new Projects do not try to pull them too early, and endanger the successful completion of the Project they are working in its end-stages. But in organizations with a static – or even declining – contract backlog – these transitions become much more problematic. I’m reminded of the old Mr. Magoo cartoons, where the title character is functionally blind, but doesn’t know or acknowledge it. He believes he is taking a stroll through a park when he is, in fact, walking along a steel beam that is being craned into position many stories above the city streets below. Just as Mr. Magoo seems to step off of the flying beam, another comes along in mid-air, just under his next step, so seamlessly that he still believes himself to be in a park at ground-level. Alas, such transitions are extremely rare in the PM world, as key personnel will almost invariably be perceived as leaving their nearly-completed Project too early, or arriving at their next Project late. Then we have the Project Team members who have not been identified as “key,” but who are, nevertheless, rather talented. They, too, see the scheduled end-date of the Project approaching, but have not been informed by their Line Manager of their next assignment, leaving them to wonder if they have a future in the organization at all. The more capable ones will typically begin to explore their other options as the dreaded end-date approaches and no in-company options are presented, making them, as talented as they are, “flight risks.” Many organizations with large Project portfolios will seek to mitigate this effect by hiring sub-contractors, who tend to make per hour than the regular employees, but are more easily dismissed. However, this practice only mitigates the problem – it doesn’t solve it. Ultimately, in organizations that depend on Project work but are experiencing a decline in contract backlog, Projects in their end-stages generate a great deal of organizational angst. A sort of death spiral may manifest, where uncovered workers are laid off, leading to a loss of talent and, therefore, capability, which then causes a further erosion of the organization’s ability to win more work. Such organizations may seek to ramp up their proposal backlogs, but the win rate is an unforgiving element in this formula. So, with apologies to Dylan Thomas, I would wrap by saying Good PMs, whose follow-on proposal the client did reject, See their successes utterly fall away. Rage, rage against the dying of the Project. [i] Retrieved from https://www.cloudbees.com/blog/top-6-management-fads-this-century on April 6, 2026, 19:46 MDT. [ii] Ibid. |
Posted on: April 08, 2026 10:13 PM
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Think You Have A Culture Problem? Think Again.
| On more than a couple of occasions I have encountered managers or conference paper presenters who are under the impression that one way of advancing PM capability within the organization is to somehow change the “culture,” by which I took to mean the set of beliefs and attitudes that determine the target organization’s approach to implementing the basics of Project Management. One presenter I remember based the entire implementation progression structure on Bruce Tuckman’s famous “forming-storming-norming-performing” cycle[i], from 1965(!), as if such a sequence should be expected to play out regardless of the scope being pursued, or even the technical agenda that had been laid out to achieve it. And, while I will readily admit that a corporate culture steeped in management philosophies that are inconsistent with – or even hostile to – Project Management will make advancing such a capability extremely difficult, the culture is not the source of your problem. In fact, the poor-culture-is-stopping-my-PM-advancement causality loop might have it exactly backwards. To place “culture” in its appropriate role in the advancement of the PM capability maturity within the macro-organization, I’m going to assert (what I believe to be) a novel idea: culture is downstream from success. “But Michael!” I can hear GTIM Nation say, “what about all of the communiques from Human Resources telling us how to treat each other? All of the training? All of the team-building exercises? All of the company picnics and office parties? Surely these have a greater impact on corporate culture than a portfolio Cost Performance Index above 1.00!” To challenge such seemingly common-sense objections, I would like to start with a reference to last week’s blog, and its main take-away: never employ the sunk cost fallacy. All of those corporate get-togethers would evaporate pretty quickly if the organization were to realize a drop in its proposal backlog because both its current and potential client base were to realize that that organization couldn’t reliably and consistently deliver its Projects on-time, on-budget. But to the point of culture being downstream from success, consider a small company with two large Projects making up its portfolio. Project Nice is staffed by people with the same level of technical competency as Project Mean, but there are some differences. Project Nice Team members have, well, nicer offices than the other Project, and spend more indirect dollars on things like office parties and training. Management is on good terms with those Team members, and trust among the personnel is high, resulting in low turnover. This Project Team’s indirect rates are higher because of all of this, but management believes that it’s worth it. Conversely, management on Project Mean treats their employees as expendable, which is actually appropriate, since almost all of them are flight risks. They experience much higher rates of stress than their counterparts, their offices are in trailers, are cubicles, or are cubicles in trailers. Office parties are simply the non-managers getting together at the nearest watering hole after work to blow off steam. Oh yeah, one more relevant parameter: one of these two will succeed, and the other will fail, in dramatic fashion. Forgive the cartoonishly dramatic contrasts, but they are necessary to perform the following mental exercises. If the market share being targeted by our dual-personality organization values on-time, on-schedule delivery (which is basically everybody), then the culture manifested by the entire org will turn on which Project succeeds, and which one fails. If Project Nice fails (late, overrun, with no follow-on work), because their overhead was too high, their employees too complacent, their managers reluctant to eliminate poor performers, etc., etc., then the entire organization can be expected to manifest the culture of Project Mean. On the other hand, if Project Mean fails because its turnover rates are high, stress-related absenteeism is excessive, or the lack of cooperation (stemming from a lack of trust) results in an inability to meet deadlines, then the macro-organization will most likely see a shift in culture more aligned with Project Nice (if for no other reason than Project Mean’s higher attrition rate). I believe that the primary driver behind this phenomenon has to do with the natural human tendency to ascribe causality to things that happen sequentially in time, even if it’s inappropriate to do so. In the above scenario where Project Mean succeeded while Project Nice failed, Project Mean might have succeeded in spite of its boorish treatment of its team members, its success really having nothing to do with its harsher culture. Still, it’s been my experience that the successful portion of the organization – however that “success” is defined – invariably ends up setting the cultural tone for the rest, at least until the locus of success leaves that part of the portfolio. Want to change the organizational culture to be more accommodating to PM? Don’t try to “correct” the culture directly. First do PM right, and then… Simply succeed. [i] Retrieved from https://www.bitesizelearning.co.uk/resources/tuckman-stages-team-development-forming-norming-storming-performing on March 23, 2026, 19:49 MDT. |
Posted on: March 30, 2026 10:29 PM
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Finally! A GAAP Concept PMs Can Get Behind!
| When I was taking accounting in graduate school, my professor had a pretty cool story illustrating the concept of the sunk cost fallacy. Proceeding from the price of San Francisco’s iconic Golden Gate Bridge, which was around $35M USD in the early 1930s (about $777M in 2026 USD), he proposed an alternate ending to its construction, where an inventor appears and proposes to build a 100% safe and reliable transporter-like device that would do the exact same job as the massive bridge, but cost only $3M to deliver and operate in toto. Our fictional inventor appears on the scene with this proposal and device when there’s only two months left before bridge completion, and it has already incurred $30M in costs. In short, the alternative solution would ultimately save $2M in total costs, but would, of course, leave this monumental almost-completed bridge in-place. What’s the right decision here? Well, if we’re respecting the proper use of the sunk costs rule, we would go with the inventor and his teleportation device. My professor was quick to point out that, since the decision-makers were politicians, and the optics of a massive almost-complete bridge being what they were, that their decision would almost certainly be to elect to complete the bridge, but we all saw his point. The sunk cost argument should always be considered to be invalid when used to support a strategic decision about which projects to finish, and which to abandon. A much less fanciful example can be seen in the history of the Iowa class battleships of World War II. The U.S.S. Kentucky was ordered and laid down in 1942, the same year as the key naval battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. At those battles, where none of the opposing surface vessels laid eyes on the other, the utility of the aircraft carrier as the primary naval vessel over the battleship became apparent, and aircraft carriers became a priority for naval construction capacity. The Kentucky was to have been the sixth and final Iowa class battleship, but various delays in her construction led to the circumstance where she was still being built at the completion of hostilities, in September 1945. Various changes in her design were proposed to make her more compatible with the post-WW II Navy, but none of them were carried out to completion. She was cancelled at around 73% complete, and ultimately sold for scrap in June 1958.[i] The cost of an Iowa class battleship in the 1940s was $100M USD[ii], which is approximately $1,995,411,042 in 2026 dollars.[iii] Staying in 1942 money, at 73% complete, Kentucky’s cumulative Earned Value would have been $73M, meaning it had a Budgeted Cost of Work Remaining of $27M. Based on what we know of her fate, had anybody asserted the argument that the “remaining” budget of $27M should have been spent in order to avoid “wasting” the $73M already committed, that person was (rightfully) ignored. I have to admire those in the U.S. Government who arrived at AND implemented that decision. The optics must have been terrible, like leaving the Golden Gate bridge just short of completion, but they made that decision anyway. I can only imagine how furious I would have been had I been the PM of that effort. Of course, some of the $73M was recovered. Kentucky’s propulsion system was removed and used in other naval vessels, and the steel was sold for its commodity value[iv]. But, for the most part, the decision to build her in the first place, with the aid of 20/20 hindsight, was a mistake. Returning to the present-day, I can’t help but to wonder how many of today’s Projects would fall by the wayside if sponsors and executives alike had a more finely-tuned and robust maintain-or-suspend/cancel algorithm in our business models, based on the recognition that the sunk costs argument is a fallacy. In the news recently have been stories on some prominent automobile manufacturers cancelling their Electric Vehicle (EV) lines, including Ford, Honda, Kia, Nissan and Volkswagen.[v] I would speculate that, like the Kentucky, this could not have been a painless decision, given the amount of unique infrastructure that must have gone into creating those lines in the first place. Note that I am NOT advocating for Projects to be able to show an acceptable Return on Investment (ROI) to be considered a candidate to continue when the continue/cancel decision has to be made. ROI is predicated on the estimated Gain from Investment, a hopelessly subjective parameter when it comes to evaluating Projects within a portfolio. But I do have two takeaways when it comes to the decision to pull the plug on a given Project: (1) anyone who invokes the sunk costs argument should absolutely be ignored, and (2) we PMs need to be able to muster the courage to know when the scope we’re pursuing has lost its efficacy. [i] Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Kentucky_(BB-66) on March 16, 2026, 20:13 MDT. [ii] Retrieved from https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/the-navys-best-decision-ever-100000000-for-an-iowa-class-battleship/ on March 18, 2026, 19:55 MDT. [iii] Retrieved from https://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/1942?amount=100000000 on March 18, 2026, 19:57 MDT. [iv] Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Kentucky_(BB-66) on March 18, 2026, 20:52 MDT. [v]Retrieved from https://www.autoblog.com/carbuying/these-18-automakers-are-walking-away-from-ev-plans on March 18, 2026, 20:17 MDT. |
Posted on: March 20, 2026 08:29 PM
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