Back To The PM Future (A Parody)
| I was taking a long walk with my wife (who, incidentally, also holds an MBA) at 2:45 P.M. on June 21, 2026, when a DeLorean with some strange gizmo on its trunk seem to come out of nowhere (why so specific as to the time and date of this walk? I’ll explain shortly.) A tall, wild-haired fellow wearing a lab coat exited the car after a hasty parking job, and approached me. “You’re Michael Hatfield, the blogger, right?” “You have the advantage of me, sir.” “I’m one of your readers – you can call me Doc. I recently became a PMP®, and I’ve been trying to track you down in order to answer one question.” “For so much effort over one question, I hope I can answer it.” “I’ve been reading your blog on ProjectManagement.com for some time now, and I’ve noticed you often point to the difference in type, not degree, between Asset Management and Project Management.” “Yeah, that’s one of my favorite soap boxes.” “From the time period I come from … uhh, I mean, the place that I come from, the Asset Managers’ narrative has completely dominated the management sciences, especially the whole business about how the point of all management is to ‘maximize shareholder wealth.’ Here’s my question: If you had access to a time machine, and could go back in time to substitute the PM’s approach to management for the Asset Managers’ version, when and where would that be?” “Oh, that’s easy” I replied. “Go back to the 1913 Income Tax Act in the United States. It passed immediately after the 16th Amendment. If I could go back in time to the one moment in history that locked the Asset Managers’ narrative into the dominant role in the management sciences, it would be then.” “How would you change it, if you could?” “Rather than use a general ledger for computing individuals’ or corporate tax load, I would use an Earned Value Management System, and pull a percentage from failed Projects. That way, original estimates would have to become more accurate, and tax penalties would go against mis-managed Projects in such a way as to discourage poor performance, along with its attendant wasted resources. Assets sitting around aren’t good for anything, much less the basis for assessing taxes. It should be based on how those assets perform, or fail to perform.” “Can I give you a ride in my DeLorean?” “Can my wife come too?” “There’s really not enough room…” ** * * |
Posted on: July 31, 2026 12:11 AM
| Permalink |
Comments (0)
When All You Have Is A PM Hammer…
| A few blogs back I kvetched extensively about Information Technology (IT) project sponsors being unable or unwilling to specify their expected output, describing it as a derivative of “bring me a rock” syndrome[i] . But, to be intellectually honest, its supply-side counterpart is just as irksome and dangerous to IT project success, and that counterpart is this: the idea that the Project Controllers or IT PM’s favorite tool is the solution to producing the executive’s sought-after management information stream, when it certainly is not. It’s not only counterproductive to attaining the desired Project outcome, it actually turns its advocates into compromised hacks, who only need a small amount of organizational power to become completely insufferable. Before I examine this phenomenon at length, let’s take a second to zoom out of the Project portfolio-level information streams, and ask the basic question: what information do successful PMs crave? And why? GTIM Nation is familiar with my take on the Pareto Principle when it comes to management information, that the 80th percentile best managers who have access to 20% of the information needed to obviate a given decision will be consistently out-performed by the 20th percentile worst managers who have access to 80% of the information so needed. This being the case, even middling management talent will look like superstars if they are on the receiving end of timely, accurate, and relevant PM information on a sufficient scale. Enter the PM software providers. The ones who can provide this level of PM information, particularly from a unique perspective, will have very little problem monetizing such technology in the PM universe. (In a little bit of AI-related irony, if such a stack of algorithms is ever developed, the clear implication is that AI will come for our PM jobs sooner rather than later. Don’t worry – it will never happen. Probably.) Hence the rush to market one’s cost and schedule performance measurement system(s) as being whole portfolio controlling-worthy, if not the entire enterprise. This error is the mirror image of the one I’ve been accusing our friends, the accountants, of making for almost my entire writing career. No organization can be optimally (or even workably) managed from the information derived exclusively from the general ledger. Oh, sure, the “maximize shareholder wealth” adherents may disagree, but outside of them, and the academics who teach such dribble, the previous sentence’s assertion is undeniably true. So, what are we to make of the PM specialist who insists that a Critical Path or Earned Value Management-based system, even one claiming “enterprise” status, can answer the questions surrounding the pressing issues bandied about in the board room? Should we not view them with the same skepticism as the general ledger aficionados? And here an additional irony becomes apparent. The Project Controls Specialist who has become an expert on Platform X, and is convinced that this particular software generates the highly sought-after information stream that will turn those middling PMs into superstars, will push Platform X, usually to the exclusion of any and all other systems. In doing so, they present as a quasi-expert in the utility of Project Management writ large, as if to reject Platform X is to reject all of the PM codex. Again, no one Management Information System (MIS) can hope to provide a majority – or even a plurality – of the information needed to obviate the decisions required to bring even the most anodyne projects in on-time, on-budget. In essence, the one pushing the one-platform solution ends up not only discrediting themselves (and their favorite MIS) when the final product is glaringly short of expectations, they make the whole of PM look unsatisfactory as a management science endeavor by this extended act of reductionism. In case I haven’t been clear in the previous paragraphs, let me say this: there is no single MIS that can collect the data, process it into information, and deliver that information in a format that the decision-makers can use to arrive at all optimal (or even workable) PM decisions on a consistent basis, claims of being able to manage the “enterprise” notwithstanding. To disagree with the previous sentence is to engage in the previously-mentioned reductionism on a grand, PM-oriented scale. Further, it undersells the utility of PM techniques, approaches, and strategies in such a way as to imply that we PM-types can, indeed, be replaced by Artificial Intelligence bots. And I will never accede to that, because it’s simply not so. So, put down the hammer. [i] Hatfield, Michael, George Jetson, Bring Me A Rock, https://www.projectmanagement.com/blog-post/80094/george-jetson--bring-me-a-rock-.. |
Posted on: July 21, 2026 11:15 PM
| Permalink |
Comments (3)
The Underrated Hazard Of Obstructionism
| It’s time for another payoff grid (the Game Theorists’ favorite tool) to shine some light on that perennial enemy of the PMO, obstructionism. You see, PMOs don’t fail because PMI® failed to identify the best ways of capturing scope, schedule, or cost baselines; nor due to any deficiency in recognizing the best practices from across the PM universe (excepting, perhaps, the pixel-ink wasted on risk management [no initial caps]). No, PMOs often fail due to the insufficiencies of their implementation strategies, specifically where they do not line up with the dynamics of the macro-organization. And here’s the kicker: even when the most suitable implementation strategy for certain organizations has been selected, it still might fail, due to this aforementioned obstructionism. So, how does a PMO Director deal with obstructionism? First, let’s identify the specific varieties and their sources. GTIM Nation knows of my respect for the brilliant Michael Maccoby, specifically in his book The Gamesman (Simon and Schuster, 1976), in which he lays out four archetypes of corporate workers/managers: ·The Craftsman doesn’t much care about for whom he works, but cares very much about the quality of his output. ·The Company Man tends to take on the persona of the organization for whom he works. ·The Jungle Fighter succeeds via calumny and political maneuverings rather than the quality of the output. ·The Gamesman doesn’t see his paycheck as a roof over the head or food on the table. Rather, he sees the entire workaday experience as some sort of game, where his renumeration are as tokens. Back to the payoff grid. Imagine an evaluation of corporate workers along two axes: one scores if they are poor or middling performers as opposed to high performers, and the other scores if the worker is politically savvy, or not a good political player at all. Here’s what that would look like, along with the (likely) home of each of the Maccoby archetypes:
I’m going to continue under an assumption that might not be very popular outside PM circles, and that is high performers will, by nature, gravitate towards wanting an advanced PM capability within the macro-organization. Our friends, the Accountants, may believe that the point of all management is to “maximize shareholder wealth,” and to that end the desire to deliver scope on-time, on-budget may or may not be entirely incidental. But outside those who adhere to the MSW speciousness, delivering on-time, on-budget means a great deal to the enterprise’s success rates. So, if advanced PM acumen is consistent with the Gamesman’s and Craftsman’s persona, that just leaves us with the left-hand side of the performance ledger (pun intended). Unfortunately, this is where obstructionism lives, and is therefore more dangerous. If it’s one thing I’ve noticed about the Jungle Fighter types with whom I have had the misfortune to work, it’s that they can’t stand the notion that they would be identified as getting ahead solely on their political maneuverings rather than actually contributing to portfolio success. To this end they will tend to hover near the High Performers, to see who will actually succeed. The High Performers who appear to be nearing a success story will suddenly see the Jungle Fighters attempting to connect more often in order to poach high-profile but ultimately easy-to-execute pieces of scope or function in order to be more closely associated with the unfolding success story. Conversely, if a High Performer is running into extreme difficulty, and finds themselves in a situation where it takes Herculean effort just to avoid a large overrun, then the JFs will disassociate themselves from that Project as fast as they can. In the case of the PMO Director attempting to advance PM capability maturity, if it looks like it’s already headed towards success, then you’re fine. But, if they sense that such an effort will fail, they will abandon the PM cause quickly, and bad-mouth you and your attempts to bring about genuinely beneficial change to the organization. But as bad as the Jungle Fighters are, the Company Men are perhaps even worse. This archetype acts as dead weight on the PMO Director’s efforts. They won’t actively use the associate/disassociate strategy, based on the perceived odds of PM advancement success. Rather, they will seek to continue to pull a paycheck with as little disruption to their employment universe as possible. The near-twin tactics of the Slow Roll and Silent Veto, even though they can be very difficult to detect when deployed, are easily as toxic as any other obstructionist strategy. And, in a final, cruel twist, organizations that are struggling with a portfolio full of late and overrunning Projects are the ones most likely to attempt to set up a PMO in the first place, meaning that there’s a good possibility that it’s already predominantly populated by the low performer archetypes, i.e., obstructionists. I’m not recommending extended training in psychology prior to initiating a PMO implementation. But I will say that not being aware of these organizational behavior and performance pathologies, specifically obstructionism, will sink your efforts faster than overly investing in risk managers. No initial caps. |
Posted on: July 09, 2026 11:27 PM
| Permalink |
Comments (4)
AI-Assisted PMBOK®, Schmimbok, Part II
| Back when I was writing The Variance Threshold column, I wrote a piece entitled PMBOK, Schmimbok, (PMNetwork, March 2004) where I took exception with the inclusion of some areas of management under the PM umbrella that I thought shouldn’t be there (like Procurement, which, of course, is part of the general ledger). For Part II, I won’t review the PMBOK Guide’s® contents, but the style in which it’s written. Now, I know that this document serves as the cornerstone of PMI’s overall codex, and is expected to stand up to considerable academic review scrutiny, which largely precludes any stylistic nuance in its presentation. I get that. Even so, I can’t get past this sense that it’s exceptionally clunky in its style. Before members of GTIM Nation can ask “’Clunky’ compared to what, exactly?”, I would like to present a couple of AI-generated samples that will more clearly show what I’m talking about. I started by asking AskGPT to write a synopsis of Wuthering Heights as if it were written by the editorial committee that wrote the PMBOK Guide®, and well, here’s the first paragraph of what it produced: This document summarizes the Wuthering Heights Relationship & Revenge Program (WHRRP), an informally initiated, multi-generational engagement spanning two adjacent estates: Wuthering Heights and Thrushcross Grange. The program begins when Sponsor Mr. Earnshaw introduces an unvetted stakeholder, Heathcliff, into the Earnshaw household without impact analysis. This triggers sustained conflict with displaced stakeholder Hindley and creates a high-risk attachment between Catherine Earnshaw and Heathcliff, unmanaged by any governance or communication plan.[i] The world of projects is a bleak moor, where human schemes rise and sink beneath indifferent skies. This Guide, poor traveller, would arm you for that desolation. It speaks of initiations—how a project is first conceived in restless hearts and cold boardrooms; of planning, where hopes are measured, bound by scope, time, and cost, as if passion would submit to charts and baselines. It tells of executing those designs through human hands, weak and wayward; of monitoring and controlling, as managers strive to chain change itself, to hold back chaos with reports and metrics, though change beats at every window like the wind. You will find herein five great movements—Initiating, Planning, Executing, Monitoring and Controlling, and Closing—circling like seasons around ten grim domains: integration, scope, schedule, cost, quality, resources, communications, risk, procurement, stakeholder engagement. Yet beneath the processes and tools, the Guide confesses that all projects are but fragile houses on shifting ground, raised by mortals against uncertainty. It urges discipline, documentation, and governance, knowing still that no plan is safe from human pride, neglect, or fate, and that every endeavor must one day close, leaving only lessons, records, and echoes.[ii] The PMBOK Guide is, essentially, a big, careful attempt to answer one question: “What do competent project managers generally do, most of the time, when they’re not making it up as they go along?”[iii]
Back to the writing style of the PMBOK Guide®. I was actually on the writing team that developed the original Earned Value Management Practice Standard for PMI®. At a meeting held for several practice standard teams, one presenter said that a litmus test for including an assertion was that “no one who is considered a subject matter expert would disagree with it.” This, of course, was impossible, since you could get fifty PMs in a room, and they would not agree on the color of an orange. But it did steer the verbiage of the contributors towards an approach as if they were writing expecting to be attacked for what they put down, which pulled the whole document into definitively clunky territory. So, I understand why the Guide® was written in that particular style. I also know why I’ve never been invited to participate in writing the next edition of it. [i] Retrieved from https://askgpt.app/chat/019f0166-a003-71ec-93b2-352e8c46e37a on June 23, 2026. [ii] Ibid. [iii] Ibid. [iv] Ibid. |
Posted on: June 29, 2026 09:14 PM
| Permalink |
Comments (1)
The Old “Resistance To Change” Dodge
| One of the most dangerous failure modes to afflict Project Management Offices (PMOs) is easily identifiable by its post-mortem analysis, if that analysis is articulated in such a way as to place the First, let’s stipulate that, in order to advance, well, any capability within the macro-organization, we’re really looking at two distinct but related problems: (1) how to identify the optimal (or even workable) technical solution, and (2) formulating its accompanying implementation strategy. If I’ve seen it once, I’ve seen it a dozen times: a new PMO Director will come in full of confidence that the management strategies with which they are familiar will certainly work in this new environment, if only the staff will follow instructions. If (when) those strategies fail, then the fault must have been due to “resistance to change” on behalf of that same staff, the organization beyond the PMO personnel, or some combination of the two, since the exact same technical approach worked so well previously, dontcha know. The reason for the failure is virtually never perceived as the PMO Director’s inability to identify the optimal technical solution in a novel situation, or a viable implementation strategy. This managerial conceit is toxic to the PMO’s technical agenda, and potential for success. The good news, though, is that it can be avoided with a few basic concepts included in the original approach to advancing the PM capability. I want to break these basic concepts down into two bins: one for managerial leadership, and the other for executing the implementation strategy. GTIM Nation regulars know of my three rules for effective managerial leadership: 1.The effective manager-leader must be advanced enough to identify the optimal technical approach in the current environment. Recycling old strategies without proper consideration of their appropriateness in the new organization is an invitation to PMO crash-and-burn. 2.The effective manager-leader must care about the personnel in their organization. If you don’t care about your people, they will quickly pick up on it, and they won’t care about you – or your technical agenda (no matter how well-developed) – either. 3.The effective manager-leader must have sufficient confidence in the selected technical agenda that, even if they were to find themselves without a supporting organization, they would pursue that agenda anyway. Let’s add these three ground rules to the ones for developing an implementation strategy. True to the title of this blog, they were derived from Game Theory. Without going into the details, the distilled take-aways are: 1.Make the actual participation level involved in advancing the capability falling-off-a-log easy to do. If the needed level of support for advancing the targeted capability is minimal (or even non-existent), then any opposition to such change has nothing to push against. 2.For those whose active participation is required, if they fail to do so, don’t just notice. Do something about it. Call them out, put them on the spot, challenge them, use their previous words of support to remind them … whatever, just don’t let it slide. “Retaliate” is a bit harsh of a term, but if withheld needed participation goes without response, then your implementation strategy will fail to the pathologies of the Silent Veto, or the Slow Roll. 3.If those from whom you need participation are participating, but their data is sub-standard, they’re golden. Better data can be far, far more easily achieved than cooperation where it’s absent. Incorporating these elements into your leadership and implementation strategies all but removes any legitimate “resistance to change” phenomena in the macro-organization, leaving only those elements within the team who will oppose you on the most specious of grounds. The optimal (or even a workable) technical approach, coupled with an implementation strategy tailored specifically to the macro-organization, and rolled out in such a way as to minimize the additional effort needed to achieve it removes almost all of the rational bases cited in all of those articles and columns on how to deal with such resistance, just without the avalanche of psychobabble that’s often attached to them. Essentially, resistance to change is baked into the organizational cake. Blaming it for any given PMO’s demise is analogous to attributing the loss of a football game to a bunch of players in different uniforms preventing your team from scoring. PMs that understand this will see a much greater success rate. PMs that don’t will blame “resistance to change” in the post-mortem analysis. |
Posted on: June 18, 2026 09:53 PM
| Permalink |
Comments (1)
