PM-Interface

By Mike Adams, PMP®, President Elect - PMI Otowi Bridge
Twitter: @MichaelAdamsPMP, LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/michaeladamspmp

Edited & Reviewed by Sarah Maxwell, PMI Chapter Administrator
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/sarah-maxwell-91b23a4b

November 13, 2015, a new tragedy. I worked late that Friday and left my office in a hurry to meet my wife at a local Chinese restaurant for a quick dinner. We had plans to attend an Israeli-Palestine study group, which had been organized by a mutual friend. Neither of us much wanted to engage in a heavy topic at the end of a long week, however, the topic had serious potential to be interesting, and this friend is important to us both. Our attendance was important!

I arrived at the restaurant, and waited a few minutes for my wife. When she arrived, she looked upset. She sat down, soberly looked me in the eye, and asked, “Did you hear what happened?” I shook my head and braced for some bad news about one of our kids getting into trouble, or similar. She continued, “Paris has been targeted by a coordinated series of terrorist attacks, and there have been more than one hundred people murdered.” I was silent and immobile for a few moments. I then asked, “Do we know who did it? Do we know why?” She said no one had claimed responsibility. Shaking my head, I looked down, stared at a spot on the table until my wife interrupted by asking, “Are you OK?” I looked back at her and responded, “I miss the cold war!”

My mind flooded with images of the Berlin wall being dismantled by masses of people, who had finally won freedom. They jubilantly took to the streets and actively unified a broken Germany. There was laughter and crying. Families were reunited, and celebration was alive in the air. I sat in my college dormitory rapt by the history unfolding on my television screen. College seemed comparatively trivial. Perestroika ()¹ was on everyone’s tongue, and the world had become a charmed oasis, gushing possibility and excitement.

Only a few years earlier, humanity’s future looked bleak. The US and the USSR had a combined nuclear arsenal large enough to destroy the planet several times over, and the political rhetoric between the two global superpowers was aggressive and fevered. It seemed our world would likely end with a series of nuclear explosions, which would render this planet incapable of supporting human life. But on November 9 of 1989, masses of ecstatic citizens joined together to dismantle the most potent symbol of nuclear annihilation that my generation had come to know.

The Peace Dividend…

As I sprang from the protective care of my parents’ home, the world changed, and I ventured forth in high hopes of fashioning a new world, free from the nightmares of yesteryear. We would all cash in on the “peace dividend,” and create a better world.

Naiveté, optimism, youthful hope, no matter how you categorize my attitude, those dreams never materialized. Instead the sociological fallout from the tactical decisions of cold war leaders fundamentally altered today’s geopolitical landscape, and now we’re left scrambling to solve problems we don’t understand, while we ask how everything became so ugly, so fast.

Quick action, and a failure to assess!

During the cold war, we failed to assess the consequences of our actions, and in the ensuing decade we continued that trend. Today we continue to fail at assessing the sources of, and solutions to the conflicts in which we’re engaged.

According to an article in the Harvard Business Review’s November 2015 edition,² people have a bias towards taking action, even when it would be better to do nothing and wait for a thorough assessment. What if, ever since the destruction of the Berlin Wall, we’ve collectively been acting, when we should have been assessing? Why was the anticipated “peace dividend” so elusive? Why does today’s world seem less stable than only a few decades ago? Why are domestic and international terrorists a part of daily news and concern for so many people? How did this all happen and what, if anything, can we do about it?

After September 12, 2001, the USA emerged from stunning attacks with unprecedented goodwill. The global outpouring of solidarity and support was unmatched, and we capitalized on that goodwill, by mustering a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan, and later Iraq. Our collective bias towards action was insatiable, and our response, unconsidered. We committed to a course which has created a whole generation of adults, who can’t remember a time when the US was not at war on foreign soil.

But we had to act, and we had to act decisively!

I agree! However, we didn’t have to act blindly, or from anger. We should have conducted a thorough assessment of the situation. We should have considered the tactical relevance of the US training, provided to Al Quaeda fighters when they resisted the Soviet invasion of the 1980s. We should have examined Soviet failings as they attempted to conquer Afghanistan. We should have thought through the long term effects of destabilizing the region by destroying Iraq’s government. Rather we jumped into action, and today, we’re dealing with the consequences of that hasty decision with the formation of daesh, and their hatred for everyone who isn’t daesh, especially Muslims. It isn’t far-fetched to claim that things are worse than they were, and we’re the cause.

Poor assessments create strategic failures and portfolio blunders!

Portfolio management is the centralized management of one or more portfolios, which includes identifying, prioritizing, authorizing, managing, and controlling projects, programs and other related work to achieve specific strategic objectives.³

On September 20, 2001, nine days after terrorists had hijacked planes and crashed them into New York’s twin towers, destroying the World Trade Center, President George W. Bush delivered what would arguably be the most important speech of his life. Before Congress, as the globe tuned in to his broadcast, Bush said, “Americans are asking ‘Why do they hate us?’” he paused and continued, “They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms…”⁴

President Bush had answered a question of fundamental importance to Americans and to our future. In saying, “they hate our freedoms,” President Bush singled out a foundational aspect of American identity, freedom, and told us the terrorists attacks were motivated because of that freedom. His answer gave stakeholders an emotionally palatable answer, which later turned into justification for invading two countries. Bush didn’t provide useful and considered information. He communicated no vision and failed to point us towards a strategic goal. The requisite conditions for portfolio success were absent, and today, a new generation struggles with the consequences of a shallow assessment as we try to right this ship before it sinks in the storm.

Is proper assessment easy?

Some will bristle at my assertions. “We had just been attacked, we had to do something. We couldn’t appear to be passive or afraid” These are all valid points. They tug at our limbic system’s sense of truth, however, they are wrong! According to the Harvard Business Review article referenced above, a study of goalie performances during soccer penalty kicks demonstrate that goalies should never dive to the left or right, but instead, stay on their feet and try to block the shot from the center. Statistically, this improves their chances of success by thirty three percent. 

Why then do goalies, especially professional goalies, consistently dive to the right or left when facing a penalty kick? Could it be due to the fact that no one wants to be the goalie who let a game winning ball fly by, without even attempting to dive? Does it seem better to fail while looking good than to fail while doing the right thing, even if it doesn’t look as good? Researches say this is exactly why, and the real consequences of losing an important game are outweighed by the emotional consequences of doing the right thing, and possibly being vehemently criticized for a publicly ignorant perception of inaction.

But terrorism isn’t soccer, and people’s actual lives are at stake!

That is exactly my point. Making a hasty and emotional decision doesn’t improve our chances of victory in a soccer game. Neither does it improve our chances for international political success.

On Saturday, November 14, after the Democratic debate concluded, I sent a tweet to @PMInstitute suggesting that we could fix Washington by replacing our leadership with a series of competent PMPs and PgMPs. My tweet was intended as humor, however, I think it contains a great deal of validity. 

Analysis, coupled with a measured response is responsible leadership!

The PMs whom I know veer away from impassioned, reflexive action, and steer towards considered and thoughtful plans. We know that collective wisdom is better than individual genius, and that innovative solutions sprout from the synthesis of divergent ideas and opposing points of view. Any competent PM can recognize that Bush’s 2001 address before congress was a well scripted message aimed at a particular stakeholder demographic, and geared towards creation of a unified response to an unfolding crisis. My criticism does not rest in Bush’s effectiveness at leading the US in a single direction; rather I condemn his thorough failure to skillfully assess the situation and consider the components of what had contributed to creating the crisis, and what would be necessary to navigate a perilous course to its resolution.

The evolution from reactive leadership to Pause And Learn...

In 2003, NASA’s Columbia Accident Investigation Board issued a report with suggestions for how NASA should move in the direction of becoming a learning organization. The first suggested process in the report was titled, Pause And Learn (PAL). PAL is described as “the critical foundation for learning from projects.” A PAL is a discussion of project participants in which they explore what went right and what went wrong. These discussions take place shortly after the event, to minimize the bias of hindsight and maximize accurate recollection. PALs bridge the gap between individual learning and team learning.⁵ They are based on the US Army’s practice of After Action Reviews.⁶ They allow a team to share knowledge, so that the team learned a lesson, rather than lessons being held by any single individual.

In our current position, where ideological extremism has resulted in recent terrorist attacks being perpetrated against civilians in Paris, San Bernadino, Beirut, and Colorado Springs. How might a meaningful Pause and Learn point us in a better direction than our natural bias towards immediate and emotionally fulfilling vindictive action? Internally, and internationally, we are identifying enemies, making lists of targets, and planning a response. What if our knee jerk reactions are setting us up for a continuation of failures, similar to what we've perpetrated over the past twenty five years?

An Inappropriate strategy may result in disaster.

According to a Harvard Business publication from July 1963, few companies invest the necessary time into “analyzing environmental trends and using the intelligence as a basis for managing their own futures.”⁷ Is this problem so ingrained in our behavior that we’re doing the same thing in national and international politics?

In 1957, the Ford Motor Company launched the Edsel. With confidence high, the company spent 250 million dollars on extensive consumer polling, a year long pre-sales advertising campaign, specialized marketing for men, distinct from the advertising aimed at women. Ford lost 350 million dollars on this business blunder, according to the September 2015 Business Insider edition, Ford’s gamble cemented Edsel’s position as an icon of spectacular failure.

Despite Ford’s extensive polling of consumers, and their reams of consumer preference data, Ford relied on gut instincts and board-room posturing to guide their product development and product marketing. This resulted in decisions which ignored data and steered away from a data-driven strategy. Ultimately, the product failed, and the company was lucky to survive.⁸

Is it possible that the Edsel would have failed even if management had proceeded with a strategy grounded in data? Sure; however, as with professional soccer goalies, Ford’s chances for success would undoubtedly have improved with a data-driven strategy. This is where competent project managers could make a difference. PMs, as a group, tend to rely on facts for their business decisions and recommendations. This is why PMI has enjoyed fantastic success and has grown its industry influence over the course of a few decades.

A project or program manager who is guided by a strategic vision while monitoring progress and accounting for team perspective, is a leader who can guide projects towards success and see where adjustments are needed to correct course.

How might this sort of grounded assessment have impacted US actions after 9/11? How might they prescribe a course in our current predicament? At every level, assessment; based in fact, and guided by a dispassionate review of available information, indicates the path most likely to result in success.

How do you think actions might have been different in this world after the events of 9/11 had our reaction been measured and tactical rather than emotional and driven by outrage?

How could we apply these lessons as we proceed with our response to recent terrorist attacks in Paris, Beirut, Colorado Springs, and San Bernadino? 

What could we learn moving forward, and how does this impact your thinking about business?

[1] http://www.britannica.com/topic/perestroika-Soviet-government-policy

[2] https://hbr.org/2015/11/why-organizations-dont-learn

[3] http://www.pmi.org/certification/~/media/pdf/certifications/pfmp_faqs_v3.ashx

[4] http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/

[5] http://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/about/organizations/OCKO/pause/#.Vk9SUnarTmE

[6] http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/tc_25-20/tc25-20.pdf

[7] https://hbr.org/1963/07/how-to-evaluate-corporate-strategy/ar/1

[8] http://www.businessinsider.com/lessons-from-the-failure-of-the-ford-edsel-2015-9

By Mike Adams, PMP®

President Elect - PMI Otowi Bridge

Happy Holidays Everyone!

Risk avoidance can be either a risk response strategy, or a project land mine, depending on how it is performed.

Page three hundred forty four of the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) Guide, fifth edition explores risk response strategies, and the first one listed is risk avoidance.

In this context, a risk has already been identified, analyzed and explored. The project team is fully aware of the risk and its’ potential. The team actively takes steps to either eliminate the threat, or nullify the impact of the risk on the project. This is solid project management, and a desirable way to approach risk avoidance.

I have, however, observed another form of risk avoidance, which takes place much earlier in the project planning phase, and which can be catastrophic. Many people experience risk identification, analysis and management as resource intensive and unnecessary. One individual told me, “…no, you don’t engage in risk management until a risk has been triggered. Prior to that, you focus on planning, executing, and closing your project.”

From this perspective, risk analysis and response planning aren’t worthwhile activities in the project planning phase. In asking some PMs about their thoughts on risk management, I discovered that it can be perceived as a waste of time, or simply overwhelming and convoluted. One PM said, “I like the idea of risk management, but risk conversations tend to spiral out of control. They are not productive.”

All of this behavior falls into the category of a different kind of risk avoidance, where the PM, the management and the sponsor avoid engaging in robust analysis of possible risks and response. I’ll admit that the avoidance saves a bit of time upfront, and even sidesteps some stress during planning stage.

In the end, however, it is a high stakes gamble, where the PM says, “The only real risks to this project are small, and easily adjusted for. If a risk is big enough that it requires planning, it’ll be too big to deal with, and will render the project irrelevant.” This strategy ignores the possibility of less-than catastrophic events, and the impact they might have on important projects.

I have a relative, who is a skilled mechanic. He is perhaps the most skilled mechanic I’ve ever met. I have seen him accurately diagnose car problems by simply listening to the car idle for a few seconds. He is likable, skilled, and driven. Many years ago, he decided it was time to start his own repair shop. He had been in charge of a shop for years, had balanced the books, participated in marketing, and knew how the business should run.

He had accrued a substantial savings and found a shop for sale, which he purchased. He was marvelous too. Clients were happy with his service, his employees enjoyed working for him, and his future looked bright. There was nothing to stop him, except a lack of risk analysis. It turns out, the person who sold the shop to him did so, because he knew the city was planning to tear up the street in front of the business and replace utility infrastructure. The construction project was a six month project, and my relative lost everything. He was devastated, and had to move his whole family in with his in-laws.

He did recover from the incident, but it made for a stressful, trying and humiliating experience. Most importantly, however, it served as an example of what can happen, and how far the impact of a project failure can reach if the thorough and detailed risk analysis is omitted.

I have certainly experienced problems as the result of meager, or non-existent risk analysis, but nothing that approaches the extent of impact and difficulty that my relative experienced. I’ve had to sacrifice twenty hours over a Saturday and Sunday in order to mitigate a risk after it was realized, but never have I lost all of my savings.

A couple of months ago, I participated in a half day, advanced risk analysis workshop. I’ll work on a follow-up article where we can explore the details of what I learned in that workshop. It was really interesting. In the meantime, please do share about your experiences with the following questions:

What are some problems that you’ve experienced due to a lack-luster risk analysis?

What did you learn in the process?

What were your reasons for not engaging in risk analysis?

I look forward to your responses. The comments on this sight are incredibly insightful and thought-provoking.