Frank WintersPhotographer and ConservationistSandwich, Ma, United States
In the aftermath of the space shuttle catastrophe, the specific purpose and mission of the shuttle program and the larger space program seem unclear. Do you agree with this statement? If you agree, what impact do you think this has on other program factors such as risk? What lessons can we draw from the way NASA and our federal government has managed the program to date? Saving Changes...
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Kenneth KatzRelease Train Engineer/IT Project Manager| UnitedHealth GroupEnfield, Ct, United States
Space technology provides a variety of tangible benefits, including weather observation, global telecommunications and national defense. Significantly, these types of space systems are operated by commercial concerns or government agencies other than NASA.
Fundamentally, the primary mission of NASA ought to be explore outer space, which meets a variety of intangible needs including greater knowledge of Creation and an opportunity to overcome tremendous challenges. Space exploration is both exciting and a way to demonstrate societal prowess and courage on a national and international level.
The most successful space projects have met these objectives. These include both manned projects (Apollo) and unmanned projects (Hubble, Mariner, Voyager, Viking). The problem with the space shuttle and space station projects is that they are fundamentally placeholders. The United States has not chosen to embark on the next great manned space project, a manned mission to Mars. However, the United States also doesn't want to "pull the plug" on manned spaceflight, since that would imply a retreat from the high frontier, with the attendant symbolism. Of course there are also institutional factors at work.
The result of this situation is where we are today. A space shuttle and space station would make sense if their purpose was to provide an orbital assembly point and base camp for further expeditions. But in the absence of further expeditions, they really are a means of keeping the program going and maintaining human capital, in the hope of future commitment to a manned Mars mission.
In my opinion, space exploration is a wonder of our age and ought to be pursued aggressively. I believe that we need to reorient the manned space program towards great expeditions that capture the imagination. In the short term, that means pursuing the current projects, although perhaps at a reduced level, to maintain momentum and keep the skilled staff together. But beyond that, all manned space projects and activities needs to be evaluated only on the basis of how they advance exploration. Saving Changes...
Mike Cooper PMPPrincipal Project Manager (retired, sort of)| New England Project ServicesWestford, Ma, United States
Picking up on the final sentence of Kenneth's post, if NASA's mission was to "explore", that would be a more focused mission than the current NASA view that "our mandate is to pioneer the future...to push the envelope...to do what has never been done before". A mission of exploration would also be different from the NASA charter Frank referred to of "that NASA (as established by Title 5 of this act) seek and encourage to the maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space".
I think that a mission of exploration would be more conducive to capturing the public imagination - commercial use of space would be almost an inevitable spinoff, but not the primary focus.
Of course, there is the Star Trek analogy, "to boldly go where no-one has gone before".
A mission of exploration would mean that NASA would not focus on experiments in space other than those that furthered exploration - other experiments would be commercially funded. A mission of exploration does not imply either manned or unmanned - both could be part of this, as appropriate.
So I concurr with Kenneth's view on the primary mission. There needs to be public debate on this.
Frank, a great article to get the juices flowing on the need for clarity of mission in any endeavor! Saving Changes...
Several items and a note of interest. First, risk factor. Space exploration involves incredible energies. A launch vehicle is not a ?stick of dynamite.? It has the energy of a small nuclear warhead. There is no question about the risk involved. But we take a risk every time we get into our car or walk across the street. Then there is the question of dollar and human cost of a war in Iraq. That could take hundreds or thousands of American lives on the battlefield and could have terrorist consequences at home. A majority of American?s seemingly accept this risk. Second, the political factor. As Richard Feynman established during the Challenger investigation, internal politics weighs heavily on the rational process. Even senior engineers go political when they join management. That creates a familiar environment for all project managers. Third, ?Purpose? in the case of national initiatives, involves the public imagination. The ?manned space exploration? vision comes out of the passion of the likes of Goddard, von Braun, Willie Ley, Walt Disney, Collier?s, John Kennedy and a host of science fiction writers from Verne and Wells to the present who have ardently promoted space exploration as a goal for the human race. Will and vision offset risk. The note: about the Trekkie NASA mission statement ?...to do what has never been done before:? Gene Roddenberry?s ashes flew on the Columbia. Saving Changes...
Yes, the purpose and mission of the space shuttle program seem unclear. But what the article doesn't acknowledge is that the Apollo program, whose mission and purpose was supposedly crystal clear, had a failure rate (2/17) almost 10 times higher than the space shuttle program (2/113). So, did a clear mission and purpose help NASA to manage risks any more effectively? Why is the Apollo program deemed successful while we question the shuttle program? Have we somehow decided that the 2/17 failure rate for Apollo was acceptable given the goal?
I agree with those that fault the lack of the 'right' mission, not the lack of a clear mission. None of the missions that NASA has proposed for the shuttle program are ones that the public can rally around. Therefore, any risk may be too much risk. Saving Changes...
Frank WintersPhotographer and ConservationistSandwich, Ma, United States
Thanks for the thoughtful, interesting comments.
The article was not attempting to discuss the complete risk management process. Rather, it focused on the determination of acceptable risk. I believe that the true nature of the risk of shuttle operations was not well understood by all involved until the Columbia was lost. The risk of the use of rockets is high but in the case of the shuttle there is a history of design flaws that were not addressed for years -- the boosters and the heat tiles stand out as examples. While flaws of this kind in experimental or developmental vehicles might be acceptable they cannot be accepted as part of a fully operational system. Terms like developmental, operational and experimental each have there own impact on acceptable risk levels. This is why there are test pilots.
The risks of the Apollo Program were probably higher than those of the Shuttle, and the technology was less advanced. But the risk was well understood and was acceptable to those involved and most Americans given the nature of the mission and its clarity and importance of purpose. It was important, in part, because the President made it a point of national pride. You may not like the goal of Apollo or how the money was spent but that's a different issue.
The Shuttle on the other hand has never had a clear goal. It was designed to take cargo and people to a space station that didn't exist because it was not affordable, so the purpose of the shuttle changed to suit the budget -- always a red flag to project managers. The ironic aspect of the shuttle is that it was sold to our government as a mode of transport that would become routine. It has never been that but the ops folks at NASA act, in some ways as if it is. The reintroduction of the teacher in space program tells you that NASA once again was viewing shuttle operations as routine or close to it. Flying on the shuttle is not at all like crossing the street or driving a car, an analogy that I keep reading but one that doesn't hold water. There are different levels of risk associated with different kinds of activities. If an activity has a high risk it should have a high reward if we are to undertake it rationally. Bungee jumping not excluded. As I learn more about the space program I have come to feel that we humans are not ready to foot the bill - in dollars or risk - of going beyond the Moon. We may not even want to pay for going back to the Moon in person for a long time. When the Shuttle and Space Station were conceived, the price was grossly underestimated and still we couldn't afford the much lower than realistic price. As some of our leaders are saying, the time has come to rethink the entire program. Saving Changes...
"In 1972 the funding for the space shuttle was approved--but not for the space station it was designed to serve."
However, there was a space station for the shuttle to go to - Skylab, launched the following year (1973). Of course the shuttle was not ready before Skylab came down (1979), and Skylab had a number of problems. However, I believe the vision was for Skylab to be the first in a programme of space stations, and therefore there would always be a station for the shuttle to visit. Problems with the station and a shortage of funding though has meant that the US only now has another station (the ISS) - and even funding for that has to be shared with other countries. More information at Skylab at KSC
As you point out, nowdays the shuttle is far more expensive to run than was originally imagined, and I agree that perhaps the purpose is a little less clear than it was back in the Apollo programme. Your lessons learned are also very valuable across all projects.
Saving Changes...
Frank WintersPhotographer and ConservationistSandwich, Ma, United States
Thanks for the comment re: Skylab. I think this info supports my central point. The Space Station that would have been built to work with the Shuttle and support trips to Mars was a very different one than Skylab. In effect Skylab and the rockets that supported it with launch capability and crew trips was at least partly another redundant effort in the space program overall. Saving Changes...
Senior Advisor to the CEO| PMISterling, Va, United States
Speaking of design issues, here's an article from today's Washington Post.
What role should planned obsolescence play in a long-term, large-scale, high-profile program such as the Space Shuttle?
Saving Changes...
Frank WintersPhotographer and ConservationistSandwich, Ma, United States
Hi Dave, thanks for the post.
I'm not sure that planned obsolescence is the issue. Its more like imposed or accepted obsolescence, created by bad decision making and weak design. The shuttle and all the systems that support it are so complex and rigid that once they are put into an operational mode they tend to become calcified and resistant to change. This is exacerbated by the mind set and culture of NASA. One reason NASA has normalized the shuttle and its associated risk is that if a new system were introduced all of the supporting elements in the environment would be effected. The design and testing task is huge. To quote the article "But the biggest impediment to change goes back to the decision to make the shuttle the centerpiece of the U.S. manned spaceflight program." Further: "The problem that NASA has faced is they put all their eggs in the shuttle basket", said Bruce Murry, a former director of NASA's Jet Propulsion Lab in Pasadena CA. "The fundamental problems are conceptual in design. It was promoted and sold as a very safe, cheap way to access space. It is neither safe nor cheap." The space shuttle is release 1.0. NASA needs to go through several design iterations before a truly operational system will emerge. That system must include a modular design, as mentioned in the article, so that new technology can be introduced and tested without a major redesign. Saving Changes...
Have you ever come across a project in a corporation where nobody outside the project really knows why the project exists (worse still, half the project team members do not seem to be able to articulate why the project exists), and it eventually becomes apparent that it was somebody's "pet" project, with no sustainable reason for existing? Welcome to the Space Shuttle program, an initiative sold by NASA (needed a new raision d'etre after Apollo) to Congress (willing to listen) based on a non-engineering business case promising $25m per launch, 1 launch per month, and 100 missions per orbiter. As a project, the Space Shuttle has been a commercial and financial failure. It has not met any of its major goals. Launches cost 10 times as much as original predictions (even allowing for inflation, that is a horrendous overrun). Orbiters will be lucky to see 50 missions. As Richard Feynman explained in one of his books, the Shuttle is an example of a "blue sky" sketch by marketers and lobbyists with no appreciation of then-current engineering limitations in materials and technologies. That it flew at all was impressive. That it is still flying is even more impressive, given that that the whole orbiter had to be debugged bottom-up. The Space Shuttle program does rather resemble several large IT projects I have seen from a distance... Saving Changes...
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